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SAME-SEX HARASSMENT AFTER BOH BROTHERS 
 
Alex Reed* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals created a marked circuit split with its 
decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Brothers 
Construction Company.1 The court, sitting en banc, broke with its sister circuits and 
held that plaintiffs alleging same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes 
are not required “to prop up [their] employer’s subjective discriminatory animus by 
proving that it was rooted in some objective truth.”2 A male plaintiff, therefore, need 
not establish that he is effeminate or insufficiently masculine under prevailing 
cultural norms to state a cognizable same-sex harassment claim on the basis of 
gender stereotypes. Likewise, a female plaintiff need not prove that she is macho or 
inadequately feminine in some objective sense to have a viable same-sex harassment 
claim. Rather, the Fifth Circuit determined that the proper focus in such cases is on 
the harasser’s subjective perception of the victim, and more specifically, whether the 
harasser subjectively perceived the victim as failing to conform to gender norms.3 
Every circuit court to consider the issue prior to Boh Brothers, however, had 
determined that a plaintiff’s exhibition of objectively gender-nonconforming 
characteristics was necessary to raise an inference of actionable sex discrimination.4 
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1 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
2 Id. at 456–57. 
3 Id. at 457. 
4 See Prowel v. Wise Bus Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding 
that a male plaintiff who acknowledged speaking in a high voice, walking in an effeminate 
manner, and crossing his legs “the way a woman would sit” provided sufficient evidence of 
harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 
764 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal of a same-sex harassment claim where the male 
plaintiff “failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any 
observable way at work”); Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (finding no same-sex harassment where “there [wa]s no evidence . . . that [the 
female plaintiff] did not dress or behave like a stereotypical woman”); Nichols v. Azteca 
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a male plaintiff who was 
mocked for, inter alia, “walking and carrying his tray ‘like a woman’” established a viable 
same-sex harassment claim); cf. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 
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These courts reasoned that a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment on the basis of 
gender stereotypes must provide objective evidence of his or her gender 
nonconformity because without such evidence, “there would appear to be no basis 
for an alleged harasser to possess a subjective intent to discriminate against that 
victim because of nonconformance,” i.e., on the basis of the victim’s sex.5  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”6 Although the statute does not address 
harassment specifically, plaintiffs may state a cognizable Title VII claim by proving 
that sex-based discrimination created a hostile or abusive working environment.7 To 
prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff is a member 
of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) 
the harassment was “because of . . . sex”; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe 
or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment; and (5) the 
existence of a basis for employer liability.8  
The “objective evidence” standard and “subjective perception” test represent 
two competing methodologies by which courts may assess gender-stereotyping 
evidence in same-sex harassment cases to determine whether discrimination 
occurred “because of sex.” Under the prevailing objective-evidence standard, if a 
male plaintiff could not prove that he “behaved in a stereotypically feminine 
manner” while at work,9 or could prove only that he was suspected of behaving in a 
stereotypically feminine manner outside of work,10 a court would find that he failed 
to state a viable same-sex harassment claim irrespective of the harasser’s personal 
beliefs regarding the plaintiff’s gender presentation. Similarly, if a female plaintiff 
was unable to show that she conducted herself in a stereotypically masculine manner 
while on the job or that her professional appearance was insufficiently feminine by 
conventional social standards,11 a court would find that she failed to state a 
                                                      
1036 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that the evidence supported an inference of gender stereotyping 
where the female plaintiff preferred to wear men’s button-down shirts and slacks, avoided 
makeup, wore her hair short, and had previously been mistaken for a male); Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (asserting that “one can fail to conform 
to gender stereotypes in two ways: (1) through behavior or (2) through appearance” and 
finding that the female plaintiff had not introduced any evidence that she was terminated for 
failing to conform her appearance to feminine stereotypes). 
5 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 472 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
7 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
8 Nailah A. Jaffree, Note, Halfway out of the Closet: Oncale’s Limitations in Protecting 
Homosexual Victims of Sex Discrimination, 54 FLA. L. REV. 799, 809 (2002). 
9 Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). 
10 See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 
harassment was predicated on the plaintiff’s “supposed sexual practices,” which the court 
noted “is not behavior observed at work”). 
11 Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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cognizable same-sex harassment claim without considering whether she was 
subjectively perceived as gender nonconforming by her harassers. 
To date, the objective-evidence standard has constituted an almost 
insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs alleging same-sex harassment on the basis of 
gender stereotypes. A search of federal court decisions issued between March 1998 
and March 2013 reveals only nine instances in which plaintiffs were able to satisfy 
the objective-evidence standard.12 Consequently, many employers have failed to 
amend their antiharassment policies to prohibit same-sex harassment on the basis of 
gender stereotypes and have declined to train their employees on the fact that same-
sex harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire in order to violate federal 
antidiscrimination laws, apparently believing that the associated human resources 
costs stand to outweigh any corresponding reduction in their legal exposure.13 
Because Boh Brothers ostensibly represents the first faithful application of the 
gender-stereotyping theory in the context of same-sex harassment litigation, 
however, additional courts may elect to abandon the objective-evidence standard in 
favor of adopting the Fifth Circuit’s subjective-perception test. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that the critical inquiry in gender-stereotyping cases is whether 
the defendant—based on the defendant’s own idiosyncratic beliefs as to the proper 
roles for men and women—regarded the plaintiff as gender nonconforming and 
discriminated against the plaintiff on that basis.14 The standard articulated in Boh 
Brothers thus appropriately seeks to reorient the focus in these cases to whether the 
harasser subjectively perceived the harassee as failing to conform to gender norms 
regardless of whether the harassee may be said to contravene gender stereotypes in 
some objective sense.  
For employers, the subjective-perception test would seem to herald a significant 
expansion of liability. Consider the following hypothetical: Bill is a forty-five-year-
old man who works at a manufacturing plant. He has been married to the same 
woman for twenty years, and he and his wife have two children together. Bill has a 
deep, commanding voice evocative of Charlton Heston and a steady, self-assured 
demeanor reminiscent of John Wayne. His interests include hunting, fishing, home 
improvement, auto repair, and amateur boxing. An impressive specimen physically, 
Bill stands over six feet, two inches tall and weighs 185 pounds. Although he has 
lost some strength since his high school football days, he can still curl 60 pounds, 
bench press 210 pounds, and squat 290 pounds. Bill has a thick, full beard and his 
tanned, leathery skin is covered with tattoos. He has had the same short, military-
style haircut ever since his three-year stint in the Marines and the only clothes he 
ever wears are jeans, cowboy boots, and a plain white t-shirt.  
Recently, Bill’s foreman at the plant has been giving him a hard time. Steve, 
the foreman, has started referring to Bill as “Baby Doll,” “Princess,” and 
                                                      
12 Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 536–38 (2013). 
13 Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, Workplace Bullying: How to Address America’s Silent 
Epidemic, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 315, 315–17 (2004). 
14 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
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“Sweetheart.” If Bill appears to be tired or in a bad mood, Steve will ask him, “Is it 
that time of the month again?” or “What’s the matter? Did you run out of 
Pamprin?”15 Additionally, one to two times per week Steve will steal Bill’s sandwich 
out of his lunchbox, press the sandwich against his groin, and call out Bill’s name 
as he thrusts his hips against the sandwich in a provocative manner. Worst of all, 
whenever Steve notices Bill step into a bathroom stall, Steve will stand just outside 
the door, periodically rattle the latch, and whisper for Bill to unlock the door so that 
Steve can show him “what it’s like to be with a real man.”   
Bill and Steve have worked together for the last ten years, but Steve only began 
giving Bill trouble after Bill acknowledged that the Pittsburgh Steelers were his 
favorite professional football team. Steve dismissed the Steelers as “a bunch of 
damned sissies” and asserted “only teenage girls like the Steelers.” In addition to the 
aforementioned conduct, Steve will periodically warn Bill that if “Ben 
Roethlisberger asks you out on a date this weekend make sure you take your pepper 
spray.”16 
If Bill were to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a court applying the subjective-perception test 
would likely find that he had a viable same-sex harassment claim given that the 
harassing conduct was ostensibly motivated by Steve’s perception of Bill as a 
gender-nonconforming man. Bill’s inability to furnish objective proof of his gender 
nonconformity would have no bearing on the court’s analysis. The fact that Bill 
outwardly conforms to stereotypical male gender norms in terms of his appearance 
and behavior would be equally irrelevant. Rather, the court would limit its analysis 
to whether Steve subjectively perceived Bill as effeminate once Bill identified the 
Pittsburgh Steelers as his favorite NFL team. In jurisdictions utilizing a subjective-
perception test, Steve’s use of sexist epithets, obscene gestures, and sexualized 
remarks would almost certainly support an inference of sex-based discrimination 
sufficient to withstand an employer’s summary judgment motion. 
Slight variations to the fact pattern illustrate that an objectively gender-
conforming individual may be perceived as contravening gender stereotypes for an 
almost infinite variety of reasons. Assume that Steve was indifferent to Bill’s affinity 
for the Steelers and instead began mistreating Bill after observing him order a Miller-
brand beer at a local bar. If Bill could show that Steve, for whatever reason, 
subjectively perceived Miller to be an effeminate brand of beer—perhaps on the 
belief that “real men” drink Budweiser—a court would likely find that Bill had a 
cognizable same-sex harassment claim. Alternatively, assume that Steve began 
mistreating Bill only after Bill disclosed that he had never been unfaithful to his 
                                                      
15 Pamprin is an over-the-counter drug designed to alleviate menstrual pain. PAMPRIN, 
http://www.pamprin.com/product/multi-symptom.html [https://perma.cc/29A8-G4L9] (last 
visited March 11, 2016). 
16 See Judy Battista, Roethlisberger Isn’t Charged, But the N.F.L. Could Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B11 (reporting that Pittsburgh Steelers quarterback Ben 
Roethlisberger would not face criminal charges for allegedly raping a female college 
student). 
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wife. If Bill could prove that Steve regarded marital fidelity in men as an effeminate 
characteristic17—perhaps on the belief that “real men” have such voracious sexual 
appetites that they necessarily must seek out sexual encounters with women who are 
not their wives—a court would likely find that Bill had a viable same-sex harassment 
claim. Conversely, assume that Steve only began mistreating Bill after Bill 
acknowledged that he wears a beard because he likes “the hipster look.”18 Whereas 
Steve may generally regard beards as a potent symbol of masculinity, if Bill could 
show that Steve perceived Bill’s motivation for wearing a beard as effeminate to the 
extent it was based on fashion considerations, a court would likely find that Bill had 
a cognizable same-sex harassment claim. 
Thus, by eliminating the requirement that harassees exhibit readily observable, 
objectively gender-nonconforming characteristics in the workplace while at the 
same time mandating that courts conduct a rigorous, fact-intensive inquiry into the 
subjective beliefs and perceptions of individual harassers, the subjective-perception 
test would seem to portend a significant expansion of employer liability. Yet, 
employers in jurisdictions utilizing a subjective-perception test need not resign 
themselves to paying out multimillion-dollar settlements anytime they are 
confronted with a same-sex harassment claim.  
This Article examines the subjective-perception test’s implications for same-
sex harassment jurisprudence and concludes that while the test seemingly reflects a 
correct application of the law so that additional courts may elect to follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s lead, employers in these jurisdictions can take steps to prevent same-sex 
harassment and limit their legal exposure post-Boh Brothers. Part II discusses the 
“because of sex” requirement in the context of same-sex harassment litigation 
generally, and as applied to gender-stereotyping evidence specifically. Part III traces 
Boh Brothers’ progression from the initial jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor to the 
vacatur of that judgment by a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and finally 
to the affirmance of that portion of the judgment imposing liability by an en banc 
panel of the Fifth Circuit. Part IV demonstrates that Boh Brothers stands to bring 
doctrinal consistency to the Supreme Court’s same-sex harassment and gender-
stereotyping jurisprudence so that other circuits may abandon the objective-evidence 
standard in favor of adopting the subjective-perception test. Part V considers the 
subjective-perception test’s implications for employers and observes that, in the 
absence of remedial measures, employers’ legal exposure is likely to increase 
markedly. Part VI then proposes a series of reforms designed to deter employees 
                                                      
17 See Nina Bahadur, Muscle Dysmorphia and Male Anorexia Linked to Gender Role 
Endorsements, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28/muscle-dysmorphia-male-anorexia-gender-
role_n_2972757.html [https://perma.cc/HS3Z-ZPDP] (identifying “sexual fidelity” as a 
feminine gender trope). 
18 See Steven Kurutz, Caught in the Hipster Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2013, at SR9 
(identifying beards as the hallmark of male hipsters); see also John Kass, Beard Transplants 
Killed the Hipster, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2014, at D5 (contending that the popularity of beard 
transplants among urban males suggests the hipster phenomenon is primarily a fashion trend 
rather than a broader social movement). 
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from engaging in same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes in the first 
instance while mitigating the likelihood of employer liability should such 
harassment nevertheless occur. 
 
II.  THE “BECAUSE OF SEX” REQUIREMENT  
 
The amount of proof that is necessary to satisfy the “because of sex” 
requirement varies depending on whether the harasser and harassee are of the same 
or opposite sex. In cases of opposite-sex harassment, “courts have readily inferred 
the requisite sex-based causal nexus from the nature of the harassment itself when 
the harassment invokes gender-stereotypes or entails sexualized interactions that 
reinforce and perpetuate gender hierarchies.”19 Indeed, Katherine Franke has 
observed that “[i]n the traditional scenario, where a man has engaged in unwelcome 
and offensive sexual conduct toward a woman in the workplace . . . many courts 
intone the ‘because of sex’ element and then never discuss it again.”20 Conversely, 
the “because of sex” requirement often assumes dispositive significance in same-sex 
harassment cases. As noted by Andrea Kirshenbaum, “[w]ith the inference implicit 
in the traditional paradigm no longer available to do the heavy lifting, the ‘because 
of sex’ requirement . . . loom[s] large as a major obstacle to success for plaintiffs 
alleging same-sex sexual harassment.”21 Thus, the “because of sex” requirement 
constitutes a significant evidentiary hurdle in same-sex harassment cases that few 
plaintiffs are able to overcome, whereas courts are generally prepared to assume that 
opposite-sex harassment is a necessary consequence of the victim’s sex. 
The origins of this disparity are traceable to Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.,22 the 1998 case wherein the Supreme Court first held that same-sex 
harassment is actionable under Title VII.23 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous 
Court, identified three evidentiary routes by which plaintiffs in same-sex harassment 
cases may satisfy the “because of sex” requirement: first, through credible evidence 
that the harasser was homosexual so as to permit an inference the harassment was 
motivated by sexual desire; second, by showing that the harasser was generally 
hostile to the presence of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or third, via direct 
comparative evidence demonstrating that the harasser treated men and women 
differently.24 Justice Scalia was careful to note that “[w]hatever evidentiary route the 
                                                      
19 Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of 
Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies, 
and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
155, 164 (1999). 
20 Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
691, 718 (1997). 
21 Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, “Because of . . . Sex”: Rethinking the Protections 
Afforded Under Title VII in the Post-Oncale World, 69 ALB. L. REV. 139, 160 (2006). 
22 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
23 Id. at 79. 
24 Id. at 80–81. 
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plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue 
was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 
‘discrimination because of sex.’”25 
Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that harassing conduct need not be 
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of sex discrimination, an 
examination of fifteen years’ worth of case law confirms that most of the plaintiffs 
who have satisfied the “because of sex” requirement relied on evidence of the 
harasser’s real or perceived homosexuality.26 Of the 236 opinions issued between 
March 1998 and March 2013 in which a federal court made a specific determination 
on the “because of sex” requirement, plaintiffs in forty-one cases prevailed under 
Oncale’s first evidentiary route, plaintiffs in five cases prevailed under Oncale’s 
second evidentiary route, and plaintiffs in sixteen cases prevailed under Oncale’s 
third evidentiary route.27 Thus, approximately one quarter of plaintiffs in same-sex 
harassment cases have been able to satisfy the “because of sex” requirement using 
one of the three evidentiary routes listed in Oncale, with two thirds of these plaintiffs 
having relied on credible evidence of the harasser’s homosexuality. This has led one 
commentator to deride Oncale as “providing valuable protection to the straight . . . 
population from the predatory desires of gay[s and lesbians].”28 
Justice Scalia did not include “evidence of gender stereotyping” among his 
proffered routes, but a growing number of courts are willing to consider such 
evidence as proof that the harassment constituted discrimination “because of sex.”29 
This is not altogether surprising given that every circuit court of appeals to consider 
the issue has found that the Oncale categories were intended to be illustrative rather 
                                                      
25 Id. at 81. 
26 Clarke, supra note 12, at 536–37. 
27 Id. 
28 Chris Diffee, Going Offshore: Horseplay, Normalization, and Sexual Harassment, 
24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 302, 315 (2013). 
29 E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. 
Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2005); Nichols v. Azteca 
Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 262–64 (3d Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 
252, 259–60, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 
1997). Significantly, “[n]o court of appeals has held that a plaintiff alleging same-sex 
harassment cannot meet the because-of-sex requirement with gender-stereotyping evidence.” 
Brief of Appellee at 31, EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d 
en banc, 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-30770). 
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than exhaustive.30 Even so, outside of gender stereotyping, “very few cases have 
looked beyond the three evidentiary routes listed in Oncale . . . .”31  
The Supreme Court first recognized the gender-stereotyping theory of sex 
discrimination in the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.32 Following an 
unsuccessful partnership bid, Ann Hopkins was encouraged by her employer to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”33 Hopkins responded by suing her 
employer on a gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination, and the Supreme 
Court thereafter ruled in her favor, stating: 
 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”34 
 
Because Oncale did not reference the gender-stereotyping theory of sex 
discrimination generally or the Price Waterhouse decision specifically, lower courts 
have struggled to determine when and under what circumstances victims of same-
sex harassment may rely on evidence of gender stereotyping to satisfy the “because 
of sex” requirement. Most courts have opted to pursue a relatively conservative 
approach to the extent they would define the gender-stereotyping theory’s outer 
bounds in terms of the specific factual circumstances of Price Waterhouse.35 These 
courts utilize the objective-evidence standard and require proof that an individual 
contravened gender norms in some highly visible, objective sense even where there 
                                                      
30 E.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 762–65; Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., 397 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th 
Cir. 2005); Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262–64; Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1007–
09 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Matthew Clark, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand 
Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313, 318 n.45 (2003) (asserting that “the text of Oncale makes 
clear . . . that its evidentiary routes are not exclusive”); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of . . . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 74 (2007) (noting “many courts have agreed [that] this list of example 
routes was not meant to be exhaustive”). 
31 Diefenbach, supra note 30, at 70. 
32 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989). 
33 Id. at 231–35. 
34 Id. at 251. 
35 See, e.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 
2005) (finding that a female plaintiff was not entitled to relief on a gender-stereotyping 
theory of sex discrimination where she failed to introduce evidence that she “did not dress 
or behave like a stereotypical woman”). 
2016] SAME-SEX HARASSMENT AFTER BOH BROTHERS 449 
is evidence the harasser subjectively perceived the individual as gender 
nonconforming and discriminated against the individual on that basis.36  
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ostensibly has taken a more 
holistic approach in seeking to harmonize the gender-stereotyping theory of same-
sex harassment with the Court’s broader antidiscrimination jurisprudence. This latter 
approach is reflected in the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the subjective-perception test, 
which absolves plaintiffs of having “to prop up [their] employer’s subjective 
discriminatory animus by proving that it was rooted in some objective truth.”37 The 
subjective-perception test has its origins in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Boh Brothers Construction Company, which is the focus of Part III 
below. 
 
III.  EEOC V. BOH BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Brothers Construction 
Company,38 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the prevailing objective-
evidence standard for assessing gender-stereotyping evidence in same-sex 
harassment litigation and concluded that the proper focus in such cases is on the 
harasser’s subjective perception of the victim, and more specifically, whether the 
harasser subjectively perceived the victim as contravening gender norms.39 The Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling was far from unanimous, however, with six of the sixteen judges 
signing onto a series of blistering dissents. 
 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
 
Kerry Woods was hired by Boh Brothers Construction Company to work as a 
structural welder on an all-male bridge repair crew.40 The crew superintendent was 
a man named Chuck Wolfe, and he oversaw a worksite in which he and his crew 
used “very foul language” and were prone to “locker room talk.”41 Wolfe was “a 
primary offender” when it came to vulgarity, with crew members describing him as 
“rough” and “mouthy.”42 
                                                      
36 See cases cited supra note 4. 
37 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
38 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
39 Id. at 471–72. 
40 Id. at 449. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. Boh Brothers described Wolfe as “an equal opportunity boor” who “was crass 
and rude to everyone in the workplace.” Original Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 29, EEOC 
v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-30770) [hereinafter Boh 
Brothers’ Original Brief]. In seeking to depict Wolfe as an equal opportunity harasser, the 
company asserted that his abusive conduct was “equally distributed among gender, 
nationality, and sexual orientation.” Id. See also Michael E. Chaplin, Workplace Bullying: 
The Problem and the Cure, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 437, 449 (2010) (noting that “equal 
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Within a few months, however, Wolfe began to direct his abuse almost 
exclusively at Woods.43 Approximately two to three times per day Wolfe would refer 
to Woods as “pu--y,” “princess,” or “fa--ot,” and approximately two to three times 
per week, Wolfe would approach Woods from behind and simulate anal sex.44 
Additionally, Wolfe exposed his penis to Woods on approximately ten occasions 
while urinating off of bridges, sometimes waving at Woods and smiling as he did 
so.45 On another occasion, Woods awoke from a nap in his car to find Wolfe standing 
just outside the driver’s side door.46 According to Woods, Wolfe appeared to be 
zipping up his pants and, upon seeing that Woods was awake, said something to the 
effect of “if your door wouldn’t have been locked, my d-ck probably would have 
been in your mouth.”47  
This more targeted form of abuse began after Woods acknowledged that he 
preferred to use Wet Ones48 rather than toilet paper, an inclination Wolfe viewed as 
“kind of gay” and “feminine.”49 Wolfe explained the basis for this belief in a 
subsequent EEOC interview: 
 
Mr. Woods sat at a table with a bunch of iron workers and told us that 
he brought, you know, feminine wipes—not feminine wipes—but Wet 
Ones or whatever to work with him because he didn’t like it, didn’t like to 
use toilet paper. It’s [not] the kind of thing you’d want to say in front of a 
bunch [of] rough iron workers. They all picked on him about it. They said 
that’s kind of feminine to bring these, that’s for girls. To bring Wet Ones 
to work to wipe your ass, you damn sure don’t sit in front of a bunch of 
iron workers and tell them about it. You keep that to yourself if in fact 
that’s what you do.50 
                                                      
opportunity harassers (i.e., those who are jerks regardless of race, sex, etc.) may harass with 
impunity”).  
43 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 449. 
44 Id. Boh Brothers asserted that “Wolfe and other witnesses provided undisputed 
evidence that Wolfe referred to other members of the crew in the same manner” and offered 
“undisputed evidence that Wolfe [feigned anal intercourse with] at least three other members 
of the crew.” Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 
F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-30770) [hereinafter Boh Brothers’ Reply Brief]. 
45 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 449–450. 
46 Id. at 450. 
47 Id. Wolfe characterized the incident as a joke. Boh Brothers’ Original Brief, supra 
note 42, at 26. 
48 Wet Ones Fresh ‘n Flush personal hygiene wipes were manufactured by Playtex 
Products until their discontinuation in 2013. Wet Ones Fresh ‘n Flush, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130905031159/http://www.wetones.com/FreshandFlush.aspx
[https://perma.cc/B79U-ARF5 ] (last visited June 1, 2014). 
49 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 450. 
50 Id. The manufacturer’s advertisement for Wet Ones Fresh ‘n Flush read as follows: 
“Try the refreshing way to wipe. Sensitive areas deserve gentle handling. Wet Ones Fresh ‘n 
Flush personal hygiene wipes are large and soft, soothing as they thoroughly clean. Alcohol-
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Approximately one year after being hired, Woods was laid off for lack of 
work.51 Woods thereafter filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, accusing 
Boh Brothers of sexual harassment.52 Following a three-day trial, a jury found in 
favor of Woods on his sexual harassment claim and awarded him $201,000 in 
compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.53 Boh Brothers then filed 
a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion for a new trial, both 
of which were denied.54  
 
B.  The Panel Decision 
 
On appeal, Boh Brothers argued that the district court had erred in denying its 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.55 The company maintained that the 
three evidentiary routes of Oncale were the exclusive means by which plaintiffs in 
same-sex harassment cases may satisfy the “because of sex” requirement.56 The 
district court, therefore, allegedly committed reversible error in allowing the EEOC 
to rely on gender-stereotyping evidence to demonstrate the sex-based nature of the 
harassment.57 Alternatively, Boh Brothers argued that the EEOC’s gender-
stereotyping evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict in Woods’s favor.58 
In regard to Boh Brothers’ first argument, the Panel noted that “although other 
circuits uniformly have allowed evidence of sex stereotyping in considering 
discrimination claims under Title VII, there is at least some resistance to allowing, 
in same-sex harassment suits, evidence that does not fall within any Oncale 
category.”59 The Panel then traced the origins of the gender-stereotyping theory and 
                                                      
free and hypoallergenic, they deliver an ultra-smooth combination of Witch Hazel, Vitamin 
E and Aloe so they won’t irritate your skin.” Wet Ones Fresh ‘n Flush, 
http://www.wetones.com/FreshandFlush.aspx [https://perma.cc/B79U-ARF5] (last visited 
June 1, 2016). 
51 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 451. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (“The District Court reduced the compensatory damages award to $50,000 to 
comply with the $300,000 statutory damages cap.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Boh Brothers’ Original Brief, supra note 42, at 8.  
56 Id. at 11–16. 
57 Id. at 16–23. 
58 Id. at 24–38. 
59 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2012). In support of 
this proposition, the Panel cited one Sixth Circuit opinion: Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, 
Inc., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012). Although Wasek seemingly regarded the three Oncale 
routes as the exclusive means of satisfying the “because of sex” requirement, the Sixth 
Circuit did not address the issue directly because the plaintiff’s claim was found to implicate 
Oncale’s first category. Id. at 467–68. Additionally, Wasek was an unreported decision, 
whereas Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, 453 F.3d 757, 763–65 (6th Cir. 2006), a case 
in which the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the availability of additional evidentiary routes 
beyond those identified in Oncale, was a reported decision and is therefore controlling under 
452 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
observed that “[t]he case before us stands in sharp contrast to Price Waterhouse, in 
which there was considerable evidence that the plaintiff did not conform to the 
female stereotype.”60 Indeed, the only indication that Woods did not adhere to 
traditional notions of masculinity was that he preferred to use Wet Ones rather than 
toilet paper, a fact that did “not strike [the Panel] as overtly feminine.”61 Because 
there was insufficient evidence of gender stereotyping to establish Woods’s same-
sex harassment claim, the Panel declined to address the broader question of whether 
plaintiffs may rely on gender-stereotyping evidence to satisfy the “because of sex” 
requirement.62  
Accordingly, the Panel vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the 
district court with instructions that the complaint be dismissed.63 The EEOC 
thereafter sought and obtained en banc review.64 
 
C.  The En Banc Decision 
 
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected Boh Brothers’ argument that the 
EEOC could not, as a matter of law, rely on gender-stereotyping evidence to 
establish a same-sex harassment claim.65 The court noted that every circuit to 
consider the issue had determined that Oncale’s evidentiary routes were meant to be 
illustrative rather than exhaustive.66 After independently examining the opinion’s 
text, the Fifth Circuit agreed with this interpretation and held that plaintiffs in same-
sex harassment cases are not restricted to the three evidentiary routes identified in 
Oncale.67 Moreover, because Oncale did not purport to overturn or otherwise restrict 
the relevancy of Price Waterhouse in the context of same-sex harassment litigation, 
the Fifth Circuit found that the EEOC was entitled to rely on gender-stereotyping 
evidence to prove that Woods was subjected to sex discrimination.68  
                                                      
circuit rules. 6TH CIR. R. 206(c).  
60 Boh Bros., 689 F.3d at 462. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 463. 
64 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 712 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 2013). 
65 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
66 Id. at 455. 
67 Id. at 455–56. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court used the phrase “for 
example” when identifying the second evidentiary route as an instance in which the sex-
based nature of the harassment could be inferred notwithstanding the absence of sexual 
desire. Id. Additionally, the court found it significant that the Supreme Court, after listing 
the three evidentiary paths, stressed that “‘[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses 
to follow,’ he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue . . . actually constituted 
discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.” Id. at 455 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 
(1998)). 
68 Id. at 456. 
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In regard to Boh Brothers’ second argument—that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a finding of sex-based harassment—the Fifth Circuit stated: 
 
In conducting this intent-based inquiry, we focus on the alleged 
harasser’s subjective perception of the victim . . . We do not require a 
plaintiff to prop up his employer’s subjective discriminatory animus by 
proving that it was rooted in some objective truth; here, for example, that 
Woods was not, in fact, “manly.” Rather, in considering the motivation 
behind a harasser’s behavior, we look to evidence of the harasser’s 
subjective view of the victim.69  
 
Applying these principles here, and drawing all reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is enough evidence to 
support the jury’s conclusion that Wolfe harassed Woods because of sex. 
Specifically, the EEOC offered evidence that Wolfe, the crew 
superintendent, thought that Woods was not a manly-enough man and 
taunted him tirelessly. Wolfe called Woods sex-based epithets like “fa—
ot,” “pu—y,” and “princess,” often “two to three times” per day[, and] 
Wolfe himself admitted that these epithets were directed at Woods’s 
masculinity.70 
 
 . . . .  
 
In addition to this name-calling, Wolfe mocked Woods with several 
other sexualized acts. For example, Woods testified that Wolfe would 
approach him from behind and “hump” him two to three times per week 
(which equates to more than 60 instances of simulated anal sex), that 
Wolfe exposed his genitals to Woods (sometimes while smiling and 
waving) about ten times, and that Wolfe suggested that he would put his 
penis in Woods’s mouth.71  
 
A reasonable juror, therefore, could have viewed Wolfe’s behavior as an 
attempt to denigrate Woods for not adhering to Wolfe’s stereotypical notions of 
masculinity,72 leading the Fifth Circuit to affirm the judgment for Woods on the 
issue of liability.73  
 
                                                      
69 Id. at 456–57. 
70 Id. at 457. 
71 Id. at 459. Judge Jolly’s dissent and Judge Jones’s dissent were found to “operate 
from a different record” in that “they either ignore this evidence, or construe it against—not 
in favor of—the jury verdict.” Id. at 459 n.13. 
72 Id. at 459–60. 
73 Id. 
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D.  The Dissents 
 
The six judges in the minority authored a series of dissents that were especially 
pointed in their criticism of the majority’s rationale and holding. Judge Jolly, for 
instance, accused the majority of “untether[ing] Title VII from its current mooring 
in sexual discrimination” so that “[i]ts application now veers from the realm of valid 
action against actual sexual harassment to a new world, in which Title VII prevents 
not only sexual harassment, but also myriad other undesirable conduct—regardless 
of whether that conduct, in fact, even resembles sexual discrimination.”74 Although 
Judge Jolly conceded that evidence of gender stereotyping may in some instances 
satisfy the “because of sex” requirement, he asserted that “there is simply no 
evidence, garnered from Woods, Wolfe, or any of the other men who testified, that 
Woods failed objectively to conform to traditional ‘male gender norms.’”75  
Judge Jones wrote a separate dissent highlighting the economic harms that 
stood to befall employers under the majority’s subjective-perception test.76 She 
began by observing that “[v]ulgar speech is ubiquitous in today’s culture and is 
everywhere else protected from government diktat by the First Amendment,” 
whereas “vulgar or offensive speech [in the workplace] may now inspire litigation 
that costs employers hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend; may forever 
stigmatize the ‘harasser’ whose principal crime was bad taste; may be outlawed by 
workplace sensitivity training; and may subject workplaces to intrusive, court-
ordered injunctive monitoring.”77  
Judge Jones went so far as to prepare a faux memorandum setting forth various 
rules and policies employers may wish to adopt in light of the majority’s decision.78 
The memorandum is written in an overtly sarcastic tone and is designed to imply 
that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s admonitions to the contrary, the majority 
would seek to transform Title VII into a general civility code. For example, one of 
the proposed rules for all-male worksites warns that “some workers may be put off 
by jokes about personal grooming, scented deodorant, chest hair, or clothing as a 
form of gender hostility” and goes on to suggest that “[p]oking fun at a worker for 
drinking a diet soda, not being able to eat a raw jalapeno, using ‘Wet Ones’ or 
‘Purell’ to clean himself, or calling someone a ‘wimp’ or ‘wuss’ or ‘geek’ may get 
us sued . . . .”79 The memorandum concludes with a recommendation that employees 
                                                      
74 Id. at 470 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 471–72. Boh Brothers never argued that objective evidence of Woods’s gender 
nonconformity was necessary for the EEOC to prevail. Rather, the company acknowledged 
that “[t]he EEOC had to establish that Wolfe had a specific discriminatory animus against 
Woods based on sex because of Woods’ gender non-conformity to Wolfe’s view of what a 
man should be like.” Brief of Appellant at 29, EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-30770), 2011 WL 5154957, at *29.  
76 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 475 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. at 475–76. 
78 See id. at 482–84 (attaching “Etiquette for Ironworkers” memorandum). 
79 Id. at 484. 
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be advised to contact the company’s “newly hired Sex Stereotype Counsellor in the 
HR Department” with any questions.80 
Shifting her attention to the majority’s legal analysis, Judge Jones argued that 
Wolfe’s use of derogatory epithets and obscene gestures was insufficient to sustain 
the jury verdict.81 She openly mocked the majority’s contention that the critical 
inquiry is whether the harasser subjectively perceived the victim as violating gender 
norms given that “all of the gender stereotyping same-sex harassment cases to date 
have regarded the nongender-conforming behavior or appearance of the 
plaintiff . . . as crucial to raising an inference of illegal discrimination.”82 Judge Jones 
went on to assert that objective proof of an individual’s gender nonconformity is 
essential to raise an inference of sex-based discrimination, and she condemned the 
majority’s subjective-perception test as “foster[ing] an entirely protean, standardless 
cause of action.”83 Judge Jones and her colleagues, therefore, would have adopted 
the objective-evidence standard and vacated the district court’s judgment for 
Woods.84 
 
E.  Boh Brothers’ Impact 
 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Boh Brothers, every circuit court to consider 
the issue had determined that a plaintiff’s exhibition of objectively gender-
nonconforming characteristics was necessary to raise an inference of actionable sex 
discrimination.85 These courts reasoned that a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment 
on the basis of gender stereotypes must provide objective evidence of his or her 
purported gender nonconformity because without such evidence, “there would 
appear to be no basis for an alleged harasser to possess a subjective intent to 
discriminate against that victim because of nonconformance,” i.e., on the basis of 
the victim’s sex.86 In Boh Brothers, however, the Fifth Circuit opted to pursue a 
more integrative approach to the “because of sex” requirement by seeking to 
harmonize the gender-stereotyping theory of same-sex harassment with the Supreme 
Court’s broader antidiscrimination jurisprudence.  
As discussed in greater detail in the next section, the standard articulated in Boh 
Brothers appropriately seeks to reorient the focus in same-sex harassment cases to 
whether the harasser subjectively perceived the harassee as failing to conform to 
gender norms regardless of whether the harassee may contravene gender stereotypes 
in some objective sense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that the critical 
inquiry in gender-stereotyping cases is whether the defendant—based on the 
defendant’s own idiosyncratic beliefs as to the proper roles of men and women—
                                                      
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 477. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 470–87. 
85 See cases cited supra note 4. 
86 Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 472 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
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regarded the plaintiff as gender nonconforming and discriminated against the 
plaintiff on that basis.87 Additional courts, therefore, may elect to abandon the 
objective-evidence standard in favor of adopting the Fifth Circuit’s subjective-
perception test. 
 
IV.  BOH BROTHERS AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY 
 
Presently, only courts within the Fifth Circuit are required to examine a 
harasser’s subjective perception of the victim in evaluating whether gender-
stereotyping evidence is sufficient to establish a same-sex harassment claim.88 
Because Boh Brothers ostensibly represents the first faithful application of the 
gender-stereotyping theory in the context of same-sex harassment litigation, other 
courts may choose to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s subjective-perception test. Employers, 
therefore, should resist the temptation to dismiss Boh Brothers as a legal aberration 
confined to the Fifth Circuit and instead recognize the possibility of a legal 
environment in which overtly masculine men and patently feminine women may 
assert viable same-sex harassment claims. 
 
A.  Lower Courts’ Misapplication of Price Waterhouse 
 
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s admonition in Price Waterhouse that, “[b]y 
focusing on Hopkins’ specific proof . . . [,] we do not suggest a limitation on the 
possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an 
employment decision,”89 every circuit court to consider gender-stereotyping 
evidence in a same-sex harassment case has required the plaintiff to prove that he or 
she exhibited readily observable, objectively gender-nonconforming characteristics 
in a manner reminiscent of Ann Hopkins.90 The Sixth Circuit, for example, 
dismissed a male plaintiff’s same-sex harassment claim notwithstanding the 
existence of a question of fact as to whether his harassers subjectively perceived him 
as effeminate.91 Although the plaintiff alleged that his male coworkers often referred 
to him by the nickname “Kiss” and on various occasions remarked that he had 
“titties,” hinted that he experienced menstrual cycles, and implied that he assumed 
a traditionally feminine role in his sexual practices,92 the Sixth Circuit found these 
allegations deficient on the grounds that: 
 
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse focused principally on 
characteristics that were readily demonstrable in the workplace, such as 
the plaintiff’s manner of walking and talking at work, as well as her work 
attire and her hairstyle. Later cases applying Price Waterhouse have 
                                                      
87 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
88 See Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 444. 
89 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251–52. 
90 See, e.g., supra cases in note 4. 
91 See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764. 
92 Id. at 759, 763, 769. 
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interpreted it as applying where gender non-conformance is demonstrable 
through the plaintiff’s appearance or behavior. By contrast, the gender 
non-conforming behavior which Vickers claims supports his theory of sex 
stereotyping is not behavior observed at work or affecting his job 
performance. Vickers has made no argument that his appearance or 
mannerisms on the job were perceived as gender non-conforming . . . and 
provided the basis for the harassment he experienced.93 
 
Conversely, in finding that a male plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence of his 
gender nonconformity to state a prima facie claim of same-sex harassment, the Third 
Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff openly contravened male gender norms to the 
extent he 
 
had a high voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed; . . . crossed 
his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the way a woman would 
sit”; walked and carried himself in an effeminate manner; . . . talked about 
things like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed the buttons 
on his [work equipment] with “pizzazz.”94 
 
These courts seemingly regard a plaintiff’s exhibition of readily observable, 
objectively gender-nonconforming characteristics as proof that the harasser was 
sufficiently aware of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class—i.e., gender-
nonconforming persons95—to formulate a subjective intent to discriminate on that 
basis.96 At first blush, this would appear to be consistent with rulings in other 
disparate treatment cases where courts have required plaintiffs whose membership 
in a protected class was not otherwise apparent to prove that the employer had direct 
knowledge of their protected status.97  
                                                      
93 Id. at 763 (citations omitted). 
94 Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287. 
95 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘in forbidding employers to discriminate 
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting City of 
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))). 
96 See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 472 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jolly, J., 
dissenting) (“When . . . the subjective discriminatory animus of the employer is itself in 
question, objective evidence [of the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity] may be necessary to 
demonstrate the presence or absence of such an intent.”). 
97 Angela Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Trait-Based 
Discrimination: Cautionary Tales from Title VII & an Argument for Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY 
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 166, 192 (2009) (“Several federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court 
have held that in a disparate treatment case a plaintiff must put forth evidence that the 
employer had knowledge of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.”); see also 
Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that an 
458 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
Under the McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green98 framework, a plaintiff 
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by 
showing, among other things, that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class.99 
Although certain characteristics, such as race and sex, are often readily apparent so 
that no additional proof as to the plaintiff’s protected class status is necessary, a 
plaintiff alleging discrimination on the basis of nonobvious characteristics, such as 
religion, disability, or pregnancy must, as a threshold matter, prove that they 
informed their employer of their protected status. As the Third Circuit observed: 
 
The traditional McDonnell Douglas–Burdine presumption quite 
properly makes no reference to the employer’s knowledge of membership 
in a protected class because, in the vast majority of discrimination cases, 
the plaintiff’s membership is either patent (race or gender), or is 
documented on the employee’s personnel record (age). This case, 
however, is different [because the plaintiff did not inform her employer 
that she was pregnant and was not showing signs of pregnancy at the time 
she was terminated]. We cannot presume that an employer most likely 
practiced unlawful discrimination when it did not know that the plaintiff 
even belonged to the protected class. The employer’s knowledge, in this 
class of cases, is a critical element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . . 
 
In other cases involving personal attributes not obvious to the 
employer, courts have regularly held that the plaintiff cannot make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination unless he or she proves that the 
employer knew about the plaintiff’s particular personal characteristic. An 
employee’s religion, for example, is often unknown to the employer, and 
we have accordingly required that employees had informed their 
employers of their religious beliefs prior to the alleged discriminatory 
                                                      
employer cannot intentionally discriminate “on the basis of a condition of which it [is] 
wholly ignorant”). “Title VII allows plaintiffs to contest intentional discrimination on a 
disparate treatment theory . . . ,” Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 
280–81 (2014), and the Supreme Court “has recognized that a ‘hostile working environment’ 
characterized by sexual harassment . . . constitutes disparate treatment.” Recent Case, 
Employment Law — Title VII — Fifth Circuit Holds Evidence of Sex Stereotyping Insufficient 
in Same-Sex Harassment Action — EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th 
Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703 n.52 (2013) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1989)). 
98 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas framework “allows plaintiffs lacking 
direct evidence [of discrimination] initially to create a circumstantial inference of 
discrimination and then rebut any legitimate explanations articulated by the employer.” 
Robert S. Whitman, Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate 
Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REV. 863, 864 (1989).  
99 Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 209, 215 (2012). 
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action in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on 
failure to make reasonable accommodations . . . . 
 
Likewise, disabilities are often unknown to the employer, and, 
because of that, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant employer 
knew of the disability to state a prima facie case of unlawful discharge . . . . 
 
Pregnancy, of course, is different in that its obviousness varies, both 
temporally and as between different affected individuals. It is difficult to 
imagine that an employer would not be aware that an employee is in the 
later stages of her pregnancy, at least if the employer sees the employee. 
When the pregnancy is apparent, or where plaintiff alleges that she has 
disclosed it to the employer, then a question of the employer’s knowledge 
would likely preclude summary judgment. If the pregnancy is not apparent 
and the employee has not disclosed it to her employer, she must allege 
knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie case, evidence from 
which a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was 
pregnant.100 
 
Similarly, courts confronted with same-sex harassment claims predicated on 
gender-stereotyping evidence seem to regard an individual’s ostensible gender 
nonconformity as being equivalent to a person’s nonobvious protected class status. 
Unlike undisclosed religious beliefs, imperceptible disabilities, or undetectable 
pregnancies, however, individuals alleging same-sex harassment on the basis of 
gender stereotypes are not permitted to rely on direct evidence that a harasser 
subjectively perceived them as belonging to a protected class and discriminated 
against them on that basis.101 Rather, courts have regarded an individual’s exhibition 
of readily observable, objectively gender-nonconforming characteristics as an 
additional element plaintiffs must prove in order to prevail on a same-sex harassment 
claim when, in reality, the extremity of an individual’s visible gender nonconformity 
merely suggests that the harasser was likely aware of—and therefore could have 
                                                      
100 Geraci, 82 F.3d at 581 (citations omitted). 
101 Cf. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception 
Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 99 
(2013) (observing that “some courts are now rigidly applying . . . the ‘membership prong’ 
[of McDonnell Douglas] . . . to hold that misperception discrimination plaintiffs are not 
protected under Title VII,” where “misperception discrimination” refers to situations in 
which an employer misperceives an individual as belonging to a particular race, religion, 
sex, or ethnicity and then discriminates on the basis of that misperception). See also Andrew 
M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1190 (noting that courts 
adjudicating racial discrimination claims must assess whether the “defendant’s knowledge of 
the plaintiff’s race” is sufficient to establish the membership prong of McDonnell Douglas, 
which requires courts to examine “the plaintiff’s ‘subjective’ race, in the eyes of his 
employer, not his ‘objective’ race, what he ‘really is’ [in some empirical sense]”). 
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been motivated by—the individual’s protected status. This confusion of evidentiary 
means and ends is confirmed by a plain-text reading of Price Waterhouse. 
 
B.  Reconciling Price Waterhouse with the Supreme Court’s Broader 
Disparate-Treatment Jurisprudence 
 
Prior to Boh Brothers, courts consistently seized on the fact that Ann Hopkins 
was advised to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry”102 as indicating that plaintiffs 
in same-sex harassment cases must display objectively gender-nonconforming 
characteristics in the workplace if they are to prevail on a gender-stereotyping 
theory.103 Yet, these statements were relevant only to the extent they revealed a 
subjective perception among the partnership that Ann Hopkins was macho or 
insufficiently feminine.104 This interpretation is confirmed by Justice Brennan’s 
observation that: 
 
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of 
an aggressive female employee as requiring “a course in charm school.” 
Nor . . . does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an 
employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued 
suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her 
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.105  
 
Rather, it was the partners’ stereotype-laden remarks that were dispositive of 
the liability issue in Price Waterhouse as they revealed the existence of an 
illegitimate discriminatory motive.106 In finding that sex stereotyping influenced 
Hopkins’s partnership prospects, the Supreme Court observed,  
 
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from all of the 
firm’s partners; that it generally relied very heavily on such evaluations in 
making its decision; that some of the partners’ comments were the product 
                                                      
102 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (quoting Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
103 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The 
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse focused principally on characteristics that were readily 
demonstrable in the workplace, such as the plaintiff’s manner of walking and talking at work, 
as well as her work attire and her hairstyle.”). 
104 See Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal 
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 193, 212 (2009) (recognizing that an individual’s “state of mind is not itself observable 
but can only be inferred from the [individual’s] statements and actions”). 
105 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. 
106 Id. at 251, 256. 
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of stereotyping; and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those 
particular comments . . . .107  
 
Based on these facts, the Court found that “a plausible—and, one might say, 
inevitable—conclusion to draw . . . is that the [firm’s management team] in making 
its decision did in fact take into account all of the partners’ comments, including the 
comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s proper 
deportment.”108 Thus, the Court did not address whether Hopkins contravened 
gender norms in some objective, empirical sense, but instead limited its analysis to 
the subjective beliefs and perceptions of the individual partners as manifested 
through their written remarks.  
A “subjective perception” interpretation of Price Waterhouse, moreover, 
renders the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination consistent with the 
larger body of disparate-treatment jurisprudence.109 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that the critical inquiry in disparate treatment cases is whether the 
employer possessed a “subjective intent to discriminate”110 and has emphasized that 
the employer’s “state of mind” is to remain the focus in such cases.111 Indeed, in 
                                                      
107 Id. at 256. 
108 Id. 
109 See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 280–81 (2014) 
(“Title VII allows plaintiffs to contest intentional discrimination on a disparate treatment 
theory.”); Recent Case, Employment Law — Title VII — Fifth Circuit Holds Evidence of Sex 
Stereotyping Insufficient in Same-Sex Harassment Action — EEOC v. Boh Bros. 
Construction Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703 n.52 (2013) 
(noting the Supreme Court “has recognized that a ‘hostile working environment’ 
characterized by sexual harassment . . . constitutes disparate treatment”). 
110 E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003). 
111 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716–17 (1983). Various 
circuit courts of appeals, moreover, have found a viable Title VII claim where an employer 
misperceived an individual’s race or ethnicity and then discriminated on the basis of that 
misperception. See, e.g., Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“[A] harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial minority than the 
plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for a hostile work 
environment.”); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc. 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A] party 
is able to establish a discrimination claim based on its own national origin even though the 
discriminatory acts do not identify the victim’s actual [i.e., correct] country of origin.”); see 
also Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of Origin, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-relig_ethnic.html 
[https://perma.cc/L77S-GMLV] (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (noting that Title VII prohibits 
“[h]arassing or otherwise discriminating because of the perception or belief that a person is 
a member of a particular racial, national origin, or religious group whether or not that 
perception is correct”); Greene, supra note 101, at 140 (“Title VII extends protection and 
relief to individuals suffering invidious, differential treatment perpetrated by a covered 
employer because of the statute’s forbidden criteria, regardless of whether such categorical 
discrimination derives from an accurate or inaccurate categorization of an individual’s racial, 
ethnic, gender, or religious identity.”). 
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formally recognizing the gender-stereotyping theory, the Supreme Court famously 
observed that, “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot 
be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”112 Courts 
adjudicating gender-stereotyping claims outside of the same-sex harassment 
context, therefore, “typically focus on subjective motivations, asking only whether 
the employee was harassed for failing to conform to the employer’s sex 
stereotypes.”113 
The standard articulated in Boh Brothers thus appropriately reorients the focus 
in same-sex harassment cases to whether the harasser subjectively perceived the 
harassee as failing to conform to gender stereotypes, irrespective of whether the 
harassee may be said to transgress gender norms in some objective sense.114 While 
evidence a plaintiff displayed readily observable gender-nonconforming 
characteristics in the workplace will continue to provide circumstantial evidence that 
a harasser perceived the individual as contravening gender stereotypes, a plaintiff 
who seemingly conforms to established gender norms will nonetheless have a viable 
same-sex harassment claim if she can show—via direct evidence—that the harasser 
regarded her as macho or insufficiently feminine and discriminated against her on 
that basis.  
 
V.  BOH BROTHERS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Boh Brothers Construction Company115 would seem to herald a 
significant expansion of employer liability. Whereas in the past individuals who 
outwardly conformed to gender norms were unable to rely on gender-stereotyping 
evidence to establish a same-sex harassment claim, overtly masculine men and 
patently feminine women will now be able to assert viable harassment claims in 
jurisdictions utilizing a subjective-perception test so long as they are able to show 
                                                      
112 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added). 
113 Recent Case, Employment Law – Title VII – Fifth Circuit Holds Evidence of Sex 
Stereotyping Insufficient in Same-Sex Harassment Action – EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction 
Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1704 (2013). 
114 See Greene, supra note 101, at 102 (“[A]n employer’s misperception of an 
individual’s protected status does not negate an employer’s related animus, stereotyping, 
stigmatization, or the attendant malicious treatment” so that misperception discrimination is 
properly actionable under Title VII.); Craig Robert Senn, Perception over Reality: Extending 
the ADA’s Concept of “Regarded As” Protection Under Federal Employment 
Discrimination Law, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 856–57 (2009) (asserting that “‘erroneous 
discriminators’: those who incorrectly perceive or determine a person to be within a certain 
protected group or class and then discriminate . . . based on that trait” are as culpable as 
“accurate discriminators” given that they “are each motivated to act based on a protected 
trait, and each actually manifests that intent in the form of a tangible, adverse employment 
action” such that Title VII should not be interpreted to provide a safe harbor for erroneous 
discriminators).  
115 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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that at least one person in a supervisory capacity perceived them as contravening 
gender norms. Employers in these jurisdictions must, therefore, seek to differentiate 
permissible same-sex teasing and horseplay from prohibited same-sex harassment 
by attempting to discern whether the actor’s conduct is motivated by his or her 
idiosyncratic beliefs regarding the proper roles of men and women or is instead a 
benign attempt to relieve boredom and foster collegiality in the workplace.116 
Given the varied and irrational nature of gender stereotypes, however, 
characteristics that might be perceived as gender conforming by one person may be 
regarded as gender nonconforming by someone else.117 Complicating matters further 
is the possibility that the same characteristic could be perceived as either gender 
conforming or gender nonconforming based on the specific context in which the 
characteristic is exhibited and the beliefs or motivations of the individual exhibiting 
the characteristic.118 Consider the following hypothetical: Donna is a forty-five-year-
old woman who works at an advertising agency. She has been married to the same 
man for twenty years, and she and her husband have one child together—a daughter 
named Katie. Donna has a sweet, musical voice evocative of Julie Andrews and an 
elegant, graceful demeanor reminiscent of Jackie Kennedy. Her interests include 
yoga, interior design, poetry, fashion, and volunteering at her local animal shelter. 
Exhibiting a classic hour-glass shape, Donna stands five feet, five inches tall and 
weighs 140 pounds. She has curly, shoulder-length hair, high cheekbones, and long, 
delicate eyelashes. Although many of her female colleagues prefer to wear pants and 
flats to work, Donna can always be found in a dress and heels. She usually 
complements her work attire with a pair of earrings, a necklace, and a couple of 
rings, along with a dab of perfume on each of her wrists. 
Recently, Donna’s supervisor at the agency has been giving her a hard time. 
Jennifer, the supervisor, has started calling her “Don” instead of Donna and “Mr. 
Smith” instead of Mrs. Smith. Two to three times per week, moreover, Jennifer will 
refer to Donna as “Butch” or “Mrs. Doubtfire”119 in front of her colleagues. If Donna 
appears to be tired or in a bad mood, Jennifer will ask, “What’s the matter? Erectile 
dysfunction got you down?” or “Uh-oh, Low T again?”120 On several occasions, 
                                                      
116 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998). 
117 See Jaimie Leeser, The Causal Role of Sex in Sexual Harassment, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1750, 1790 (2003) (recognizing “that gender stereotypes are many and varied”); An 
Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2004) 
(observing “that gender stereotypes are often irrational”). 
118 Cf. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 485 (5th Cir. 2013) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (noting the EEOC conceded at oral argument that if a male supervisor were to 
harass a male subordinate for wearing a pink shirt, the employer’s liability would depend on 
whether the harasser does not like pink shirts generally or does not like pink shirts on men 
specifically). 
119 Mrs. Doubtfire is the title of a 1993 comedic film in which the male lead is forced 
to present himself as an elderly woman in order to secure employment. MRS. DOUBTFIRE 
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1993). 
120 The term “Low T” refers to a medical condition known as low testosterone. John La 
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Jennifer has left pictures of men in drag on Donna’s desk with notes stating, “This 
is such a good picture of you!” or “Now I know where you get your beauty tips!” 
During the firm’s annual diversity training on LGBT issues, Jennifer identified 
Donna as belonging to an “alternative family” and joked that Donna’s daughter “has 
two daddies.” Jennifer has even written a song called “Katie Has Two Daddies” that 
she sings or hums whenever she walks past Donna’s office. 
Although Donna and Jennifer have worked together for the last ten years, their 
relationship did not become strained until Jennifer discovered that Donna practices 
yoga. Jennifer asserted that “Only men and lesbians do yoga” and then asked Donna, 
“So which one are you?” Jennifer suggested that Donna should practice Pilates 
instead because “Pilates emphasizes weight loss and flexibility” whereas “yoga is 
just about increasing strength.”  
If Donna were to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, a court 
applying the subjective-perception test would likely find that she has a viable same-
sex harassment claim. Donna’s inability to furnish objective proof of her gender 
nonconformity would have no bearing on the court’s analysis. The fact that Donna 
outwardly conforms to stereotypical female gender norms in terms of her appearance 
and behavior would be equally irrelevant. Rather, the court would limit its analysis 
to whether Jennifer subjectively perceived Donna as macho once Donna 
acknowledged that she practices yoga. In jurisdictions utilizing a subjective-
perception test, Jennifer’s use of masculine epithets together with her references to 
male medical conditions and her characterization of Donna’s family as a “two-daddy 
household” would almost certainly support an inference of sex-based discrimination 
sufficient to withstand an employer’s summary judgment motion. 
Slight variations to the fact pattern illustrate that an objectively gender-
conforming individual may be perceived as contravening gender stereotypes for an 
almost infinite variety of reasons. Assume that Jennifer was indifferent to Donna’s 
affinity for yoga and that the mistreatment instead began after Donna identified 
Banana Republic as her favorite clothing brand. If Donna could show that Jennifer, 
for whatever reason, subjectively perceived Banana Republic to be a masculine 
clothing brand—perhaps because Banana Republic makes clothes for both men and 
women rather than catering exclusively to female fashions—a court would likely 
find that Donna had a cognizable same-sex harassment claim. Alternatively, assume 
that Jennifer only began mistreating Donna upon learning that Donna and her 
husband have just one child. If Donna could prove that Jennifer regarded a woman 
not having multiple children as signaling a lack of femininity, a court would likely 
find that Donna had a viable same-sex harassment claim. Conversely, assume that 
Jennifer only began mistreating Donna after Donna acknowledged that she cooks 
dinner for her family every night because she considers dining out to be a waste of 
money. Whereas Jennifer may normally regard a woman preparing dinner for her 
family as a hallmark of femininity, if Donna could show that Jennifer regarded 
                                                      
Puma, Don’t Ask Your Doctor About ‘Low T’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/opinion/dont-ask-your-doctor-about-low-t.html?_r=0. 
[https://perma.cc/9F7X-ZRPV]. 
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Donna’s motivation for cooking as being insufficiently feminine to the extent it was 
driven by financial considerations rather than the health and happiness of her family, 
a court would likely find that Donna had a cognizable same-sex harassment claim. 
Thus, each of the foregoing vignettes would represent a significant liability threat to 
employers operating in a subjective-perception test jurisdiction whereas none of 
these scenarios would provide a basis for employer liability under the objective-
evidence standard. 
The subjective-perception test’s potential to increase employer liability is 
similarly evident from a review of various circuit court decisions dismissing same-
sex harassment claims on the basis of gender stereotypes.121 Many of the plaintiffs 
who were unsuccessful under the prevailing objective-evidence standard would 
appear to have cognizable Title VII claims in a jurisdiction utilizing the subjective-
perception test.122 Consequently, employers can no longer afford to be complacent 
when confronted with allegations of same-sex harassment on the basis of gender 
stereotypes, but must instead seek to deter such conduct ab initio. 
 
VI.  PROPOSED EMPLOYER REFORMS 
 
Although the subjective-perception test would seem to herald a significant 
expansion of employer liability for instances of same-sex harassment, employers are 
not without recourse. 
 
A.  Employers Should Adopt a Comprehensive Antiharassment Policy 
 
First, and most importantly, employees must be made to understand that 
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to constitute sexual harassment.123 
                                                      
121 Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v. Bumble 
& Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 211–12 (2nd Cir. 2005); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 
1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 
(1st Cir. 1999). 
122 E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759–61 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the harassers referred to the male victim as “Kiss,” remarked that he had “titties,” 
suggested that he experienced menstrual cycles, and implied that he assumed a traditionally 
feminine role in his sexual practices); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 215 (2nd 
Cir. 2005) (observing that the harassers referred to the female victim as “Donald” rather than 
her given name of “Dawn” and suggested that she “needed to have sex with a man”); 
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1083–85 (7th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that 
the harassers called the male victim “bitch,” referred to him as “RuPaul” or “RuSpearman,” 
and assigned him tasks “traditionally reserved for women”); Higgins v. New Balance 
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the harassers mocked the 
male victim “by using high-pitched voices” and “gesturing in stereotypically feminine ways” 
while suggesting that he assumed a traditionally feminine sexual role). 
123 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
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This is especially true for supervisors, i.e., those individuals authorized to take 
tangible employment actions against subordinates:124 
 
Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for [workplace] harassment 
may depend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the 
victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in 
controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a 
“supervisor,” however, different rules apply. If the supervisor’s 
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, [i.e., precipitates 
a significant change in the plaintiff’s employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,] the 
employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, 
the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative 
defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities that 
the employer provided [(commonly referred to as the “Ellerth/Faragher” 
defense).]125   
 
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to prevail on a gender-stereotyping theory of same-sex 
harassment perpetrated by coworkers must show that the employer knew or should 
have known of the harassing conduct and failed to take appropriate corrective 
action.126 Where a supervisor is involved, however, the employer will either be 
strictly liable or liable subject to an affirmative defense.127 
A restrictive, desire-based model of sexual harassment was critical to the 
imposition of liability in Boh Brothers. In finding that Boh Brothers was not entitled 
to the Ellerth/Faragher defense, the Fifth Circuit observed that neither of Kerry 
Woods’s supervisors were aware “that conduct unmotivated by sexual desire could 
constitute sexual harassment,” or more specifically, “that male-on-male sexual 
harassment, based on something other than sexual desire, was sufficient to violate 
federal law.”128 
The court found the supervisors’ professed lack of knowledge credible given 
that Boh Brothers had promulgated an unduly vague corporate nondiscrimination 
policy and failed to provide adequate training to its supervisory personnel.129 
                                                      
124 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
125 Id. 
126 Notes, Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 
1978 (1999). 
127 David J. Walsh, Small Change: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supreme 
Court Precedents on Federal Appeals Court Decisions in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993–
2005, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 461, 471–72 (2009). 
128 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 464–68 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
129 Id. at 463–65. 
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Although Boh Brothers claimed to have a comprehensive policy vis-à-vis equal 
employment opportunity, the policy did not provide any explicit guidance regarding 
sexual harassment.130 Rather, the policy merely “offered generic statements such as 
‘[a]ll personnel actions including, but not limited to, compensation, benefits, 
transfers, [and] layoffs . . . , will be administered without regard to race, color, 
religion, disability, sex, or national origins’ and ‘[a]ll working conditions will be 
maintained in a non-discriminatory manner.’”131 With regard to training, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that Boh Brothers did not provide Chuck Wolfe with any employment-
nondiscrimination training despite his status as a supervisor.132 While Mr. Wolfe’s 
boss received “about five minutes of sexual-harassment training per year,” the 
training focused exclusively on instances of desire-based harassment 
notwithstanding the fact that “the three Oncale evidentiary routes—two of which 
have nothing to do with sexual desire—were recognized about eight years before” 
Woods began working at Boh Brothers.133 
Employers, therefore, should make certain they have promulgated a 
comprehensive sex-based harassment policy, either as part of a larger 
antiharassment/nondiscrimination policy or as an independent, stand-alone policy. 
In seeking to define the scope of prohibited conduct, employers should avoid lengthy 
catch-all provisions in favor of three distinct paragraphs corresponding to the 
various forms of sexual harassment. The following language is offered as a model:  
 
Sex-based harassment is a form of sex discrimination and is prohibited. 
 
Harassment of a Sexual Nature. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature 
constitutes prohibited sex-based harassment when (1) an individual’s 
tolerance or acceptance of such conduct is either directly or indirectly 
made a term or condition of that individual’s employment; (2) an 
individual’s acceptance or rejection of such conduct impacts employment 
decisions affecting that individual; or (3) an individual’s ability to perform 
his or her job is disrupted by such conduct or such conduct creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. For harassment 
of a sexual nature, the sex of the harasser and the victim are irrelevant, and 
the harasser and the victim may be of the same sex. 
 
Harassment Motivated by Hostility Toward a Particular Sex. Harassment 
does not have to be of a sexual nature to violate this policy. Disparaging 
comments and unwelcome conduct regarding an individual’s sex generally 
or status as a member of a particular sex constitutes prohibited sex-based 
harassment when (1) an individual’s tolerance or acceptance of such 
                                                      
130 Id. at 463. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 465. 
133 Id. at 465 n.24. 
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conduct is either directly or indirectly made a term or condition of that 
individual’s employment; (2) an individual’s acceptance or rejection of 
such conduct impacts employment decisions affecting that individual; or 
(3) an individual’s ability to perform his or her job is disrupted by such 
conduct or such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment. For harassment motivated by hostility toward a 
particular sex, the sex of the harasser and the victim are irrelevant, and the 
harasser and the victim may be of the same sex. 
 
Harassment on the Basis of Gender Stereotypes. Harassment does not have 
to be motivated by hostility toward a particular sex or of a sexual nature 
to violate this policy. Disparaging comments and unwelcome conduct 
based on a subjective belief that an individual does not conform to the 
gender stereotype for his or her sex (i.e., that a man is effeminate or 
insufficiently masculine or that a woman is macho or insufficiently 
feminine) constitutes prohibited sex-based harassment when (1) an 
individual’s tolerance or acceptance of such conduct is either directly or 
indirectly made a term or condition of that individual’s employment; (2) 
an individual’s acceptance or rejection of such conduct impacts 
employment decisions affecting that individual; or (3) an individual’s 
ability to perform his or her job is disrupted by such conduct or such 
conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment. For harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes, the sex 
of the harasser and the victim are irrelevant, and the harasser and the victim 
may be of the same sex.134 
 
Because some employees may have difficulty discerning the scope of 
prohibited conduct from definitions alone, employers should include examples of 
the type of conduct that would constitute sex-based harassment for each category 
and should do so in the context of both opposite-sex and same-sex harassment. These 
examples should be as realistic as possible and reflect sensitivity to employees’ 
actual working conditions.  
Thus, for employees working in an office environment, an employer might 
want to include the following scenarios as examples of same-sex harassment on the 
basis of gender stereotypes:  
 
(1) Anthony thinks that men should be aggressive negotiators. 
Brandon, one of Anthony’s direct reports, is not an aggressive negotiator. 
On that basis, Anthony routinely refers to Brandon as a “timid bitch” and 
a “d-ckless wonder,” often advises Brandon to just get pregnant and quit 
already, and denies certain opportunities to Brandon on the grounds that 
“this is a job for a man.”  
                                                      
134 The proposed definition is modeled on existing EEOC guidance. See 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(a) (2015) (equating sex-based harassment with harassment of a sexual nature).  
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(2) Wendy believes that women should always eat a salad for lunch. 
Jessica, one of Wendy’s subordinates, prefers to have a sandwich for 
lunch. As a result, Wendy shouts “Hey, this isn’t the men’s room,” 
whenever Jessica enters the women’s restroom, routinely suggests that 
Jessica supplement her income by becoming a sperm donor, and 
occasionally touches Jessica’s breasts while commenting on the odd shape 
of her “pecs.”  
 
(3) Mark thinks that men should be proficient in Microsoft Excel. 
Steven, one of Mark’s direct reports, is not proficient in Microsoft Excel. 
Consequently, Mark habitually refers to Steven as “Stephanie,” tells 
Steven that “women should be seen and not heard” when Steven attempts 
to speak during meetings, and occasionally emails pictures of his erect 
penis to Steven along with text implying that Steven should find the photos 
sexually arousing as a woman.  
 
Examples of this sort would make clear that conduct need not be motivated by 
sexual desire or general hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the workplace 
to constitute prohibited sex-based harassment.135   
 
B.  Employers Should Prohibit the Use of Antigay Slurs and Epithets 
 
Second, employees must be made to understand that antigay slurs and epithets 
will not be tolerated in the workplace as they are often predicated on gender 
stereotypes.136 The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to make this 
observation and did so in the 1997 case of Doe v. City of Belleville.137 In Belleville, 
the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable same-sex 
                                                      
135 Employers should also consider amending their antiharassment policies to conform 
to the injunctive relief imposed by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 09-6460, 2011 WL 3648483, at *1–4 
(E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2011) (requiring Boh Brothers to adopt a written sexual harassment policy 
defining the terms “severe” and “pervasive” in the context of sexual harassment, stating that 
“no employee who complains of sexual harassment will be subjected to retaliation” and 
explaining “what unlawful retaliation and protected activity are,” and requiring that copies 
of the policy be provided to all employees, posted on the company’s website “in a reasonably 
conspicuous location,” and that the internet address for the policy be published at least once 
per year in the company’s employee newsletter). 
136 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1786 
(1998); see also Axam & Zalesne, supra note 19, at 198 (asserting that “the homosexuality-
centered epithets and insinuations that pervade so many same-sex sexual harassment cases 
do not reflect animus toward homosexuals per se, but rather reflect the harasser’s aversion 
to males who fail to conform to idealized notions of masculinity and male sexuality” and, 
concomitantly, to females who fail to conform to idealized notions of femininity and female 
sexuality). 
137 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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harassment claim because the harasser’s use of epithets such as “fag” and “queer” 
ostensibly indicated that the discrimination was predicated on the plaintiff’s 
perceived homosexuality rather than his failure to conform to gender norms.138 The 
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the presence of antigay 
epithets was not necessarily fatal to the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.139 The 
court recognized that: 
 
There is . . . a considerable overlap in the origins of sex discrimination 
and homophobia, and so it is not surprising that sexist and homophobic 
epithets often go hand in hand. Indeed, a homophobic epithet like 
“fag” . . . may be as much a disparagement of a man’s perceived effeminate 
qualities as it is of his perceived sexual orientation.140  
 
Because the Supreme Court vacated Belleville, without opinion, nine months 
later,141 the Seventh Circuit’s observations regarding the interplay between sexism 
and homophobia have been viewed with skepticism by later courts.142 In fact, courts 
adjudicating same-sex harassment claims post-Oncale have consistently seized on a 
harasser’s use of antigay epithets as proof that the offending conduct was motivated 
by the plaintiff’s actual or perceived homosexuality rather than his or her ostensible 
gender nonconformity.143 These courts often warn that the gender-stereotyping 
theory of sex discrimination cannot be used to bootstrap sexual orientation 
protection into Title VII and then dismiss plaintiffs’ same-sex harassment claims as 
permissible instances of sexual orientation discrimination.144 
In Boh Brothers, however, the use of antigay slurs and homophobic epithets 
was found to provide crucial support for Woods’s claim of sex-based discrimination. 
Chuck Wolfe routinely referred to Kerry Woods using a mixture of homophobic and 
                                                      
138 Id. at 592–93. 
139 Id. at 593–94. 
140 Id. at 593 n.27. 
141 City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
142 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74–76 (D. 
Me. 1998) (noting that the vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Belleville suggests 
the Supreme Court may favor a strict interpretation of the term “sex” that does not include 
concepts of “sexuality” or “sexual orientation”); see also Axam & Zalesne, supra note 19, at 
222 (“Regardless of the Court’s intent in vacating Doe, its vacatur has the effect of casting 
doubt on the precedential value of Doe’s reasoning, thereby limiting the influence of this 
opinion, which represents one of the few judicial attempts to conduct a careful examination 
of the sex-discriminatory significance of gender stereotyping and sexually degrading conduct 
among males.”). 
143 See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Protecting the Margins: Intersectional Strategies to 
Protecting Gender Outlaws from Workplace Harassment, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 339, 351 n.60 (2013) (collecting cases). 
144 E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006); Bibby v. 
Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261–65 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 
232 F.3d 33, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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sexist epithets such as “fa--ot,” “pu--y,” and “princess,” and Wolfe admitted on 
cross-examination that these epithets were directed at Woods’s masculinity:145  
 
Q: Now, when you said that Mr. Woods was kind of gay for using Wet 
Ones, you were saying that he was feminine; is that correct? 
 
A: I didn’t say he was gay. Said it . . . seemed kind of gay . . . .  
 
Q: So you wouldn’t say that he was gay, but you say his conduct was kind 
of gay? 
 
A: Yes, sir[.] 
 
Q: By saying that, you were saying he was feminine; correct? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: You meant he was not being manly; is that correct? 
 
A: Yes, sir. 
 
Q: When you said that Mr. Woods’ conduct sounded like a homo, that 
again refers to Mr. Woods being feminine for using Wet Ones; is that 
correct? 
 
A: Yes, sir . . . . 
 
Q: So the only iron worker that you ever called queer was Mr. Woods? 
 
A: I’m thinking so. 
 
Q: And was Mr. Woods the only iron worker that you called fa—ot? 
 
A: I’m not sure. 
 
Q: Do you understand the word queer to be a slang for homosexual? 
 
A: Yes, I do. I just don’t remember if I used it for anyone else, too. I may 
have. 
 
Q: And you understand that the word fa—ot is a slang for homosexual? 
 
A: Yes. 
                                                      
145 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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Q: And you called Mr. Woods those words because you thought he was 
feminine; correct? 
 
A: No, sir. I was just playing with him. I did not think he was queer or 
homosexual. Never did, do not now. 
 
Q: You called him those words because you thought his using wet wipes 
was feminine; correct? 
 
A: Yes, sir.146 
 
Given that Woods was subjected to homophobic and sexist epithets 
approximately two to three times per day, every day, for approximately one year, 
the Fifth Circuit held there was sufficient evidence of sex-based harassment to 
sustain the jury verdict.147 
Employers, therefore, should prohibit the use of antigay slurs in the workplace 
just as they already do racial, ethnic, and religious epithets. A list of the most 
common homophobic slurs should be included in the employer’s antiharassment 
policy alongside examples of conduct constituting same-sex harassment on the basis 
of gender stereotypes.148 The list should be prefaced by a statement indicating that 
the terms are designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive such that employees 
should not view the omission of any particular slur as an indication that it is 
permissible to use that slur in the workplace. Employees, moreover, should be 
encouraged to use common sense and err on the side of caution if they are unsure as 
to whether a particular term is prohibited under the policy as an antigay epithet. The 
policy should conclude by noting that the speaker’s intent is irrelevant such that a 
goal to amuse or entertain rather than demean or disparage will not excuse a 
violation. 
 
C.  Employers Should Revise Their Internal Grievance Procedures 
 
Third, employers should make certain they have established a formal grievance 
process for receiving, investigating, and resolving complaints of same-sex 
harassment predicated on gender stereotypes.149 An employer’s adoption of a 
“sensible complaint procedure,”150 together with the promulgation of a 
comprehensive antiharassment policy, will often be found to fulfill the first prong of 
                                                      
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 461. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 134–135. 
149 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, EEOC 
NOTICE NO. 915.002 (1999) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE], 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/6GLF-H3T3]. 
150 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 809 (1998). 
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the Ellerth/Faragher defense.151 Recall that in the absence of a tangible employment 
action, the Ellerth/Faragher defense allows an employer to escape liability for a 
supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate provided, “(1) the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the 
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective 
opportunities that the employer provided.”152 The existence of a formal grievance 
process, moreover, will often satisfy the second prong of the defense as well: 
 
Based on the presumption that complaint procedures are reasonable, 
many courts also presume that employee failure to use complaint 
procedures is unreasonable. Accordingly, once successful on the first 
prong, employers often prevail on prong two of the affirmative 
defense . . . by showing that the employee did not complain, delayed in 
complaining, or complained to an official within the company who was 
not specified in the complaint procedure.153  
 
The absence of a formal grievance process was critical to the imposition of 
liability in Boh Brothers. Although Boh Brothers’ nondiscrimination policy 
identified one of the company’s officers as the individual responsible for 
“coordinat[ing] Company efforts” in the area of equal employment opportunity, the 
Fifth Circuit observed that “[t]his language . . . says nothing regarding how or to 
whom an employee should report a harassment claim.”154 Boh Brothers, moreover, 
“failed to provide its supervisors with any guidance regarding how to investigate, 
document, and resolve harassment complaints once they were reported.”155  
The Fifth Circuit contrasted the company’s belated and perfunctory 
investigation of Woods’s same-sex harassment claim with its prompt and thorough 
investigation into Wolfe’s alleged property theft.156 The individual responsible for 
overseeing both investigations, Wayne Duckworth, “took no notes and asked no 
questions during his meeting with Woods,” after which Woods was sent home—
without pay—for three days.157 Moreover, “a few months” passed before Duckworth 
                                                      
151 Joshua C. Polster, Workplace Grievance Procedures: Signaling Fairness but 
Escalating Commitment, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 638, 647–48 (2011); see also Anne Lawton, 
Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 214–15 (2004) (“[F]ederal courts in virtually every circuit 
interpret the employer’s obligation to prevent workplace harassment under prong one of the 
affirmative defense as satisfied by proof of a sexual harassment policy and grievance 
procedure.”). 
152 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (citations omitted). 
153 Polster, supra note 151, at 648–49 (footnotes omitted). 
154 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 464 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 465–66. Wolfe was accused of “stealing company gas and shrimping on 
company time.” Id. at 450. 
157 Id. at 465. 
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took any steps to investigate Woods’s harassment claim and that action was limited 
to speaking with Wolfe and one other individual for approximately ten minutes 
each.158 Conversely, Duckworth hired a private detective to look into allegations 
Wolfe was stealing company resources.159 The detective’s investigation spanned 
84.75 hours and culminated in two written reports to management.160 Although 
Duckworth demoted Wolfe for suspicion of misusing company property and “safety 
issues,” he did not take any disciplinary action against Wolfe for harassing 
Woods.161 Given the disparate nature of the investigations and certain other factors, 
the Fifth Circuit determined that Boh Brothers failed to establish the first prong of 
the Ellerth/Faragher defense.162 
Employers, therefore, should revise their internal grievance procedures to 
facilitate the submission, investigation, and remediation of same-sex harassment 
claims predicated on gender stereotypes.163 Grievance procedures must be designed 
in a manner that encourages victims of same-sex harassment to come forward and 
complain.164 Because “a complaint process is not effective if employees are always 
required to complain first to their supervisors . . . since the supervisor may be the 
harasser,” employers should identify several individuals as being eligible to receive 
employee complaints.165 Employers should ensure that these designees include 
members of both sexes and that employees understand they are free to file a 
complaint with a designee of their choosing. 
Allowing employees to complain to someone of the opposite sex would 
encourage victims of same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes to take 
action where they might otherwise elect to remain silent. Victims of same-sex 
harassment may be reluctant to file complaints with members of the same sex for 
fear their claims will not be taken seriously or out of concern same-sex designees 
will view the victim’s harassment as justified in light of the victim’s implicit or 
explicit gender nonconformity.166 By alleviating the possibility that same-sex 
designees will dismiss otherwise legitimate complaints of same-sex harassment as 
“boys being boys” or “girls being girls” while at the same time allowing opposite-
sex designees to serve as objective, third-party arbiters of same-sex harassment, 
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163 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 149.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
166 See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment 
“Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1179 (2008) (observing that men are more 
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employers would likely be found to have established effective complaint procedures 
for the purposes of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.167 
An effective grievance process must also provide for the prompt and impartial 
investigation of all same-sex harassment complaints.168 Studies have shown that an 
employer’s “prompt investigation” of harassment allegations reduces “the odds of 
the plaintiff prevailing on the liability issue by over 90% . . . .”169 This is consistent 
with EEOC guidance advising that fact-finding investigations “be launched 
immediately” upon receipt of a complaint.170  
In the absence of physical evidence conclusively establishing or refuting the 
veracity of the complainant’s allegations, employers must rely on information 
obtained during interviews of the relevant parties to determine if a violation of the 
employer’s antiharassment policy has occurred.171 Although the EEOC has 
promulgated “examples of questions that may be appropriate to ask the parties and 
potential witnesses” during such interviews, the questions are phrased in 
exceedingly general terms.172 Consequently, employers relying exclusively on 
EEOC guidance may fail to elicit information relevant to claims of same-sex 
harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes. Employers, therefore, should 
incorporate additional, gender-stereotyping specific questions into the EEOC’s 
proffered script. 
For the complainant, these questions might include: (1) Did the alleged harasser 
ever call you antigay slurs173 or refer to you with sex-based epithets? (2) Did the 
alleged harasser ever touch you in a sexual or provocative manner, threaten to touch 
you in such a manner, or act as though such a touching were imminent? (3) Did the 
alleged harasser say or do anything to indicate that he or she perceives you as gender 
nonconforming in terms of your appearance, behavior, beliefs, preferences, romantic 
interests, etc.? 
For the alleged harasser, these questions might include: (1) Did you ever call 
the complainant antigay slurs or refer to the complainant using sex-based epithets? 
(2) Did you ever touch the complainant in a manner that might be perceived as sexual 
or provocative, threaten to touch the complainant in such a manner, or act as though 
such a touching were imminent? (3) Did the complainant ever say or do anything to 
make you think the complainant is effeminate/insufficiently masculine (if the 
complainant is a man) or macho/insufficiently feminine (if the complainant is a 
woman)?  
                                                      
167 See Lawton, supra note 151, at 210 (noting that the ability to bypass a harassing 
supervisor often provides sufficient evidence of an effective grievance procedure to satisfy 
the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense). 
168 ENFORECMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 149.  
169 Walsh, supra note 127, at 517. 
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171 See id. 
172 See id. (recommending that complainants be asked to provide the “who, what, when, 
where, and how” of the alleged harassment). 
173 See supra Part VI.B. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Because Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Brothers 
Construction Company ostensibly represents the first faithful application of the 
gender-stereotyping theory in the context of same-sex harassment litigation, 
additional courts may elect to abandon the objective-evidence standard in favor of 
adopting the Fifth Circuit’s subjective-perception test. Employers, therefore, must 
resist the temptation to dismiss Boh Brothers as a legal aberration confined to the 
Fifth Circuit and instead take steps to prepare for the possibility of a legal 
environment in which overtly masculine men and patently feminine women may 
assert viable same-sex harassment claims. By eliminating the requirement that 
harassees exhibit readily observable, objectively gender-nonconforming 
characteristics in the workplace while at the same time mandating that courts 
conduct a rigorous, fact-intensive inquiry into the idiosyncratic beliefs and 
perceptions of individual harassers, the subjective-perception test would seem to 
portend a significant expansion of employer liability.  
Employers are not wholly without recourse, however. First, employers should 
make certain they have promulgated a comprehensive antiharassment policy that 
specifically prohibits same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes while 
providing realistic, workplace-specific examples of the types of conduct that would 
be found to violate the policy. Second, employers should prohibit the use of antigay 
slurs and epithets in the workplace as such terms are often predicated on gender 
stereotypes. Third, employers should revise their internal grievance procedures to 
facilitate the submission, investigation, and remediation of complaints alleging 
same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes. Ideally, such measures 
would ensure that individuals designated to receive employee complaints include 
members of both sexes and mandate that all employee interviews include gender-
stereotyping-specific questions. Collectively, these proposals will serve to deter 
employees from engaging in same-sex harassment on the basis of gender stereotypes 
in the first instance while allowing employers to successfully invoke the 
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense should such harassment nevertheless occur. 
